

*Domestic violence around the world:* <http://www.someplacesafe.org/DV01.htm>

*Domestic violence resource center:* <http://www.dvrc-or.org/domestic/violence/resources/C61/>

*The Duluth model:* <http://www.theduluthmodel.org/about/index.html>

*National online resource center on violence against women:* <http://www.vawnet.org/research/>

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## Drive, Overview

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### Introduction

The notion of the drive has a long history, even though it is nowadays mostly identified as a psychoanalytic concept. In *politika* Aristotle speaks of two basic drives – one for procreation and another aiming for self-preservation (ca. 335 BC, I 2, 1252a27–30) – to explain the order and development of human social groups in relation to the family/household (*oikos*) and to slavery. This figure is picked up by medieval clerics in the discussion of sexual practice and the meaning of marriage. While sexual lust as an end in itself would clearly lead into peril, as Thomas Aquinas argues in *Summa Theologiae*, the longing for begetting children is enrooted within a natural human drive and therefore to be endorsed (written 1265–1274, II-I, q. 94, a. 2). In German Idealism the notion of the drive becomes a contested concept: While Kant discusses determinants and motives of human agency as drives

in the way of a purely natural aptitude, Hegel reformulates the drive as “quest for reason”; Schopenhauer and Nietzsche then again interpret the drive towards the end of the nineteenth century as the “dark side of human nature.” The concept is introduced into medical discourse by leading sexologists, whereas the conceptualization of a “sex drive” goes back to Albert Moll (1897).

### Definition

The *drive* is one of the central concepts of Freudian psychoanalysis. It is often – and not least because of the false translation in the first standard edition by Strachey – mistaken for *instinct*. However, the reference of the drive to the biological is rather unclear. The drive seems to be more of a heuristic device that accounts for both the corporeality of human experiences and impulses and, when focusing specific “drive fates,” their biographical emergence. In the interweaving of nature and life history in the drive concept, psychoanalytically oriented critical (social) psychologists saw the opportunity to engage with the concrete mediation of nature and society in the (bourgeois) subject.

### Keywords

Psychoanalysis; metapsychology; Freud; sexuality

### Traditional Debates

In Freud's work the drive concept first appears in the *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality* (1905). In his seduction theory, developed in *Studies on Hysteria* (Freud/Breuer, 1895), Freud traced the symptoms of his patients to memories of early childhood sexual abuse that were aroused in puberty and, in the light of blossoming sexuality, were then reinterpreted and thereby taking up a horrifying meaning, subsequently leading to illness. In 1897 he retracted this model of trauma theory, not only since he doubted the

prevalence of sexual violations of children, but moreover because he realized that in the unconscious “one cannot distinguish between truth and fiction that has been cathected with affect” (Freud, 1985, p. 264). Thus, he developed the conception of unconscious fantasies and wishes (see esp. Freud, 1900), which from 1905 on he placed in the context of his new theory of infantile sexuality, inextricably linked with drive theory. From then on, Freud focused on the conflicts of drives, which arose in individual psychosexual development and were seen as a causal force of symptoms.

Predecessors of the drive concept are, on the one hand, “inner stimulations” that the “psychological apparatus” has to manage or “bind” (see Freud 1895) and, on the other hand, the concept of unconscious wishes emphasized in *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900), which function as the distinguishing “[driving] force[s] of the dream” (p. 561). The drive is not simply a somatic force. Rather, Freud periodically reconceptualizes the relationship between somatic and psychic moments of the drive: at times it is imputed to biology and merely represented in the psychic (1915a, p. 109); at times it is itself the psychic representative of a somatic source of stimulus (1905, p. 167); and ultimately it is articulated as “a concept on the frontier between the mental and the somatic” (1915b, 121f).

In *Instincts and Their Vicissitudes* (1915b), Freud differentiates between the drive’s source, pressure, aim, and object. The *source* is a bodily situation of tension that imposes a “demand for work” (p. 122) on the mind, whereby a quantitative, economic moment – or rather a *pressure* – is introduced. As opposed to the notion of instinct, for which an aim and object are pre-given, Freud shows how variably and arbitrarily the choice of object proceeds. Accordingly, the aim, which is sometimes articulated statically as “the removal [or rather: sublation] of this organic stimulus” (1905, p. 167), can always change along with the chosen object and the relation towards it. Thus, in his case analyses and considerations on the emergence of symptoms, character structures, or slips, Freud does not deal with the “drive” as such but rather with

the specific “drive fates” – that is, the object relations developed during the course of life as well as the fantasies, wishes, and fears captured and efficacious within.

Freud’s drive theory can be divided into three phases, each of which centers on a dualism of the drive. At the beginning, the ego- or self-preservation drive embodied by the reality principle is opposed to the sexual drive. The latter is described as “polymorphously perverse” (1905, p. 191) – that is, it strives at unlimited forms of pleasure – and its energy is called “libido.” With the introduction of narcissism (1914), inextricably linked to the idea of the ego-drive arising via a libidinous “cathexis” (libidinal investment) of the ego, the former antipode dissolves. Drive theory in this phase tends towards monism, as the new dualism between narcissistic and object libido is false insofar as the two poles can morph into one another. Ultimately, Freud establishes a new polarity between the life-drive or Eros that strives for bonding and the death-drive or Thanatos aiming at the destruction of bonds (see 1920). In fact the latter turns against the ego itself, yet it can also be led outwards and express itself as “destructive drive.”

Laplanche and Pontalis (1967) point out that some contradictions in the drive concept can be resolved through the basic distinction between the dynamics of the *bodily needs* Freud termed “self-preservation drive” and the “actual” *drive*, “sexual” in the broad Freudian sense, operating in the mode of pleasure and unpleasure. The former has a clear goal and rather corresponds to an instinct, whereas the latter arises, according to Freud, from “anaclisis” (attachment) on the relief of bodily urges – so to speak, as their “by-product” (1905, p. 233) – and is tremendously variable with respect to goal and object.

All his life Freud came back to the question of the drive’s somatic foundation, hereby often referring to physiological and biological discourses, as the attempt to biologically root the new dualism of drives in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (1920) shows. But then, Freud himself stressed the speculative moment and depicted the theory of drives self-critically as “our mythology”: Drives “are mythical entities, magnificent in their

indefiniteness” (Freud, 1933, p. 94). This again justifies a reading of the Freudian drive as a heuristic instrument to explore the secrets of the soul.

The development of Freudian theory and especially the narcissism concept cannot be conceived without the great conflicts with his followers and colleagues Alfred Adler and Carl Gustav Jung that led to factions and the founding of new schools. While the rivals inspired Freud’s thinking with their criticism, his new concepts were concurrently directed decisively against “abbreviations” and “adulteration” of Freudian knowledge. Adler criticized Freud’s concentration on the sexual and his theory of the unconscious. According to Adler’s ego psychology, the sexual is a secondary phenomenon: pivotal instead is an innate physical inferiority of the human being that is compensated by a drive for power, which takes the sexual into its service. Jung goes another way. He adheres to the concept of libido, which he extends and desexualizes at the same time: for him, the libido is “the psychic energy” in general and encompasses everything that grows out of biological needs. As opposed to Freud’s extension of the concept of sexuality to a general principle of lust, Jung limits the sexual to the moment of procreation. He rejects the idea of an infantile sexuality, which he understands as a retrojection of adult sexuality onto a presexual phase. This extended libido is supported by a whole range of “natural needs” that are ultimately founded in an esoteric idea of the unconscious embedded in what he called “ethnic souls” [“Völkerseelen”] and archetypes as part of human nature.

## Critical Debates

Since Freud’s establishment of the drive concept in psychoanalytic theory and the first schisms following the contentions with Adler and Jung, this pivotal concept has been criticized from several theoretical as well as political perspectives. In the early feminist critique of the patriarchal bias in Freud’s concept of the bourgeois family as in Leftist critiques of Freud’s tendency to

individualize and theoretically subjectivize social conflicts, it is strikingly often Freud’s sophisticated definition of the drive – as concept on the frontier between the mental and the somatic – that is dropped in favor of a simplistic endogenic or, more often, an entirely exogenic approach to (sexual) socialization.

One of these attacks questions Freud’s disavowal of the early seduction theory that had exclusively built upon the assumption of early experiences of sexual abuse and had later been revised, as Freud was more interested in the transformative power of infantile and adult fantasies. In the 1920s Sandor Ferenczi decisively returned to the idea of neurotic symptoms being the outcomes of early experiences of abuse (see esp. 1932) and implicitly accused Freud of having underestimated these due to his focus on drive dynamics. The consequent conflict between Freud and Ferenczi was rediscovered half a century later by Jeffrey Masson (1984), Alice Miller (1981) and others, who then pled to discard the theory of infantile sexuality in favor of a pure trauma theory. Against their polemic – Freud would have denied and thereby concealed the reality of sexual abuse by reframing the existing sexual violence as mere phantasy – can be emphasized that, firstly, Freud never denied the influence of traumatic events but rather saw these as one moment in a complementary series that led to symptoms. Secondly, Ferenczi saw his own analyses as a *supplement* to the Freudian knowledge of infantile fantasy activity and certainly not as a replacement.

Another critique, brought on by the protagonists of Freud-Maxism, was directed against naturalizing and ontologizing tendencies in Freudian theory, which, they held, should be historicized. Otto Gross traced the gender-specific inner-psychological conflicts back to repressive bourgeois sexual morality and patriarchal family structures. In the context of a Marxist class analysis, Wilhelm Reich also located the nuclear family and the individual socialized within as the historical product of bourgeois-capitalist society. Both proclaimed that the various forms of perverse, chaotic, and threatening sexual drives discovered by Freud were the effects of a repressive

society, covering primordial “drives of self-development.” Yet, via this conception of a conflict-free, fundamentally “good” human nature, these proponents ensnared themselves in even stronger ontologies or biologism than Freud himself. A development into this direction can be found in Erich Fromm’s work, too. While he captured the authority-bound personality structures as specific “drive fates” brought forth by authoritarian family structure in his early work, he later turned from drive theory and replaced it with the conception of general human needs to which a society should adjust itself. It is this abandonment of drive theory by Fromm and other so-called Neo-Freudians such as Karen Horney or Harry Stack Sullivan that led to the so-called *culturism debate* between them and the representatives of critical theory, first and foremost Theodor W. Adorno and Herbert Marcuse.

From a feminist perspective, Horney especially criticizes the privileging of the male sexual development in Freudian theory and develops a concept of an innate femininity instead. With this she is paying a high price, as she drops back behind Freud’s insight into human bisexuality with its arbitrariness concerning the sex drive’s aim and object. Nevertheless she is shedding light upon the implicit phallogentrism inherent on the psychoanalytic theory of femininity. Similar to tendencies observed in Freud-Marxist arguments, the debate around the question: “Is woman born or made?” (Ernest Jones) eventually slid at this early stage into biologism by stressing innate (gender) dispositions, as Juliet Mitchell (1974) points out. The question is later famously addressed by Simone de Beauvoir in *The Second Sex* (1949), though she gets to a most different conclusion than the enquirer.

In the following phase of discussion on drive theory, its biologist tendencies are problematized. The two most prominent critics in this regard are Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Lacan. While the former interprets psychoanalysis as reflexive methodology, thereby emptying psychoanalytic theory of its content matter – while still adhering to an impulsive basis on human nature – the latter maintains the centrality

of the Freudian concept of the drive in his Kojève-inspired Hegelian reformulation of drive theory. Lacan philosophically reconfigures the drive as a both cultural and symbolic construct. In this concept the drive does not aim at its object, which can never be reached anyway, because it is always constituted in the mode of “afterwardness.” Instead the desired object is endlessly encircled. Among the feminist philosophers and psychoanalysts who followed Lacan in his Hegelian reformulation of drive theory, Luce Irigaray extrapolated the problem of Lacan still ontologizing sex differences with special verve.

One of the most recent debates on the subject was instigated by Axel Honneth’s effort to revive the relation between psychoanalysis and the Frankfurt School, which Habermas had dismissed. But then, Honneth’s revision of psychoanalysis included to – again – discard drive theory altogether by proposing a “primary intersubjectivity” instead of the Freudian “primary narcissism” and by arguing that object relations theory would be intermediated best with his Hegelian approach of a theory of recognition. This intersubjective turn was criticized sharply by Joel Whitebook (2001), who insisted on the antagonistic relation of (first) nature and social forms of interaction.

All in all it can be observed that similar figures have reappeared in the debates on the psychoanalytic concept of the drive during the last century. Recurring arguments have been revised, processed, and refined, while the question still circles around the problem of how to understand the relationship between the mental and the somatic in Freudian drive concept. While the first critiques of Jung and Adler took two fundamentally different directions (folksy esotericism of the ontologized archetypes on the one side and on the other an ego psychology stressing the conscious abilities and as consequential effects an extended social agency of the ego at cost of the recognition of unconscious dynamics), the following criticism is staged between the poles of biologizing and sociologizing arguments. Representatives of Critical Theory have instead stressed the dialectics of nature and society,

which Adorno, Marcuse up to Whitebook see represented within the constitutional maladjustment of the human subject. As natural human potentials never fully merge within the social order – especially in the given one – Adorno (1952, 1955) criticized Neo-Freudian thinkers as Fromm, Horney, and Sullivan for taking the critical sting from psychoanalysis by excommunicating the drive from their neo-conventional sociologized psychoanalysis.

At last we would like to point out two reformulations of drive theory that seem to address its core in a promising way for further research: we hereby refer to the work of Alfred Lorenzer and Jean Laplanche.

Lorenzer fully recognizes the potential of Freud's concept of the drive on the frontier between the mental and the somatic and strives to critically acknowledge the Freudian biologism instead of leaving it aside. To decipher the constitution of the drive as both social and natural, he delineates a historic-materialist theory of socialization (see esp. Lorenzer, 1972, 1981) by retracing how the experience of the infant constitutes itself in a bodily mediated process of interaction, starting as an intrauterine interplay of two organisms. These concrete, individual but also culturally mediated interactions leave "memory traces" (Freud), which Lorenzer theoretically reformulates as "interactionforms." They initially manifest themselves pre-symbolically, namely, "sensual-organismically," as body, but also function as "concepts of life" and are eventually complemented by "sensual-symbolic" and "symbolic linguistic" interactionforms, whereas the former represent pre-linguistically symbolizations (e.g., the Freudian cotton reel) and the latter signify language.

Thus, in Lorenzer's theory the drive is deciphered as structure of interactionforms, more specifically, as "matrix" of sensual practice always encompassing the "already realized inner nature" of the subject, which then belongs no more to an "historical beyond" of an archaic nature anymore (see Lorenzer 1980, p. 332 f.).

Laplanche (1999, 2007) takes up a radical decentering of the concept of drive in his

"General Theory of Seduction," which is based on the following idea: in the interaction with an infant the adult care takers also address it with unconscious fantasies. Thereby, they implant "enigmatic messages" into the child, which provoke a "translation," a psychic bond, that can only ever partially succeed, because of the infants inadequate translation codes but also because the messages (as compromise structures of conscious and unconscious wishes) are themselves contradictory. The parts of the message that remain untranslated constitute the unconscious still aiming for further translations. New translations continually arise in the course of psychic development – with the aid of new translation codes.

In Laplanche's theory the "demand for work" on the psychical no longer comes from somatic sources within but rather from *without*, as the enigmatic message from another person. The dialectic of enigmatic message and subsequent translation/repression always already takes place in the cultural field that forms the message itself and above all the process of translation.

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## Drug Prevention

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### Introduction

“Truly meaningful prevention means building a just society. It means reducing poverty, the stresses of injustice, the loneliness in a society based on consumerism,” says George Albee (2010: 99). This is a rather radical notion of prevention. The reality looks quite otherwise, alas. In general, prevention is seen as something benign and innocent, only wanting something good to happen or develop. But from a critical perspective prevention must also be seen as a regulating and disciplining strategy that ensures that the subjects monitor themselves and others according to established and dominant categories.

### Definition

“Prevention” means the forestalling of something unwanted: a defined problem should not even occur. In order to avoid the realization of the unwanted event (e.g., addiction, accidents, diseases, calamities, etc.), certain measures have to be taken. These measures can target people or structures (e.g., urban planning, architecture, social services, employment). When measures target people, they could target entire populations, certain groups, or individuals. In the case of drug prevention, classic measures are the information about postulated risks of drug use, the promotion of social skills (e.g., communication), and the promotion of psychological skills (e.g., empathy) (cf. EMCDDA, 2008: 24 ff).

The term “drugs” comes from the Dutch word “droog” which means dry or dried. Originally the word was used to refer to dried substances, which were used as medical powders. Today, in the